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Abstract Tax return information is often complex and difficult to interpret. Whether its public 
availability benefits unsophisticated users remains an empirical question. This study examines 
whether public disclosure of tax return information affects information asymmetry among 
more- and less- sophisticated investors. I investigate the unique setting of mandatory disclosure 
of three bottom-line income tax items in Australia. Using a difference-in-difference design with 
an entropy-balanced control group, I find evidence that information asymmetry decreased after 
the mandatory disclosure. The effect is more pronounced for firms with a poorer information 
environment, with higher individual ownership, and with lower media attention. The 
magnitude of the postdisclosure decline in the bid-ask spread correlates with the degree of the 
absolute book-tax gap of tax expense. This result is concentrated among firms with only 
mandatory disclosure—without any voluntary commitment or voluntary disclosure. Overall, 
the results suggest that public disclosure of tax return information does have the potential to 
reduce information asymmetry among investors. 
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Does tax return disclosure affect information asymmetry among investors? 
1  Introduction 
Against the background of frequent calls for greater tax transparency, the question of whether 
to make tax return information public, wholly or in part, continues to spark debate. Proponents 
argue that there are two main benefits (Lenter et al. 2003). First, tax returns contain important 
information beyond financial statements and can thus help to increase capital market efficiency 
and level the playing field for investors. Second, public disclosure of tax return information 
can improve firms’ compliance and accountability via public pressure. However, these benefits 
can be achieved only if tax return information can be readily understood and used for decision-
making. This precondition is uncertain ex ante, as opponents argue that tax return disclosure is 
hard to interpret (Morris 2015; Tax Executives Institute 2006). In this study, I explore whether 
tax return disclosure is broadly informative to investors by examining how it affects 
information asymmetry among more- and less- sophisticated investors.1 
On the one hand, without tax return disclosure, some sophisticated investors are better 
informed than others and thus have an information advantage—for example, those with higher 
ability to predict tax-related future cash flows from only the financial statements,2 or those with 
access to private tax-related information (Chi et al. 2014; Demere 2018). Therefore the new 
tax disclosure could reduce information asymmetry to the extent that less-informed investors 
can now process and utilize the information (Diamond 1985; Verrecchia 1982). On the other 
hand, if the newly disclosed tax information is hard to interpret, some sophisticated investors 
may have an advantage in processing and incorporating it in their decision making—either at 
 
1 I examine information asymmetry among investors instead of information asymmetry between managers and 
investors. The latter decreases as investors’ average information precision increases when any one investor or a 
group of investors (except the managers) become more informed, while the former decreases only when 
information is more evenly distributed. This notion of information distribution  is more relevant for transparency 
initiatives as it indicates that the disclosure is “broadly informative” (Lev 1988). In other words, this study 
investigates whether a greater percent of investors are becoming informed. 
2 In particular, it can be difficult for investors to piece together a firm’s particular tax circumstances, strategies, 
and risks from only the financial statements and other commonly public information sources (Hanlon 2003; 
McGill and Outslay 2004; Graham, Raedy, and Shackelford 2012).  
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the time of the release or, combined with other sources of information, in the future—thereby 
increasing information asymmetry (Bushman 1991; Cheynel and Levine 2020; Fischer and 
Verrecchia 1999; Pagano and Volpin 2012).  
I exploit a unique Australian setting, in which tax return information became publicly 
available through mandatory disclosure. On December 17, 2015, the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) for the first time published on its website bottom-line numbers (total income, 
taxable income, and tax payable) from the year 2013–2014 tax returns of firms with total 
income exceeding AUD 100 million. Subsequently, the ATO issued guidelines for voluntary 
disclosures intended to complement the mandatory three numbers. Few settings exist for 
examining the impact of public disclosure of tax return information.3 This Australian setting 
has two advantages. First, the mandatory disclosure is made by the regulator instead of firms 
and thus is exogenous (unrelated to a firm’s cost of disclosure), and the setting is, therefore, 
less subject to the concern that the informational effect is endogenously influenced by firm-
specific fundamental uncertainties (Balakrishnan et al. 2014). Second, because the disclosure 
is highly standardized, the effect is less likely to be driven by the way managers convey 
information (Bhattacharya et al. 2013).   
I begin by examining whether mandatory disclosure of tax return information affects 
information asymmetry. Using a difference-in-difference design with an entropy-balanced 
control group, I test whether the information asymmetry of mandatorily disclosing firms 
changes from the four quarters before to those after the return disclosure, compared to 
nondisclosing firms. Using the bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry among 
investors, I predict and find evidence that the disclosure on average decreases information 
asymmetry. Cross-sectional tests show that this effect is more pronounced for firms with a 
 
3 Exceptions such as Norway and Japan (until 2004) usually provide insights about individuals or small firms (Bø 
et al. 2015; Hasegawa et al. 2013), which are less likely to be targets of the global push for corporate tax 
transparency. In my Australian sample, firms are larger and more international, so that their tax return information 
is harder to interpret and the result may be more generalizable. 
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poorer information environment, both general and tax-specific, and for firms with higher 
individual ownership and lower media attention. Together, the evidence is consistent with the 
notion that less-sophisticated investors benefit from the public disclosure of tax return 
information because it reduces the cost of processing information.   
In checking whether the main effect might be caused by later, voluntary disclosures 
rather than the mandatory ones, I find that this is not the case: the results are not concentrated 
among firms with (1) an ex-ante commitment to voluntary disclosure, and/or (2) an ex-post 
realization of voluntary disclosure, relative to those without.  
In order to discover what specific information investors learn and use, I test whether—
and find evidence that—the magnitude of the decrease in information asymmetry correlates 
with the absolute difference between the tax payable on the tax return and tax expense on the 
financial statements. This result increases my confidence that the effect stems from the public 
disclosure of tax return information, instead of confounding events.  
These results collectively show that the mandatory tax return disclosure of bottom-line 
income tax items (i.e., total income, taxable income, and tax payable) decreases information 
asymmetry, and thus is broadly informative, rather than hard and costly to interpret. 
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I contribute to research on 
the usefulness of tax return information. For the Australian tax return disclosure, previous 
studies document short-term price reactions both in anticipation of, and in response to, 
mandatory tax disclosures (Chen 2017; Hoopes et al. 2018). Kays (2018) uses (the anticipation 
of) negative market reactions to argue that investor information becomes less precise after the 
ATO mandatory disclosure as tax return information is costly to understand. She finds that 
firms voluntarily disclose additional information to mitigate this negative informational effect. 
However, price reactions may stem from factors other than information content in the 
disclosure, and they represent the average change in investors’ beliefs about a firm’s position 
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rather than information asymmetry among investors (Beaver 1968). Further, my study is related 
to, but differs from, the experimental study of Dierynck et al. (2020), who examine investors 
not actively trading and focus on perceptions about whether firms are paying their fair share of 
taxes.4 In contrast, I ask whether actively trading investors understand tax return disclosure 
well enough to use it in investment decisions; and in my setting, it is possible that investors 
piece together tax return information and other information into a mosaic that reveals material 
information (Cheynel and Levine 2020). My study provides evidence that mandatory tax return 
disclosure reduces information asymmetry not only at the time of the release (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2008), but also when additional information is provided in the future (Hail et al. 
2021). Demere (2018) provides indirect evidence that private tax return information is used in 
the trading decisions of institutional investors who also participate in the syndicated loan 
market in the U.S. My study complements this study by directly showing that tax returns can 
be used by unsophisticated investors, meaning that public disclosure of tax return information 
is widely useful.  
Second, this study contributes to the literature about the effect of public disclosure on 
information asymmetry (Core 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). 
Whether additional disclosure reduces information asymmetry depends on the disclosure 
content. I analyze the informational effect of mandatory disclosure published by a regulator 
(ATO). Tax return disclosure provides more cash-related information and therefore predicts 
future cash flows differently from book information. In addition, as mandatory disclosure is 
standardized, this setting does not suffer from misclassification of mandatory versus voluntary 
financial disclosures (Beyer et al. 2010). 
 
4 My paper differs from Dierynck et al. (2020) as follows: (1) Dierynck et al. (2020)’s focus is on perceptions 
about whether firms are paying their fair share of taxes, whereas I am interested in whether general investors 
understand tax return disclosure. (2) different subset of investors are examined: I focus on those who actively 
trade, while Dierynck et al. (2020) focus on not actively trading ones. (3) In my setting, it is possible that investors 
piece together tax return information and other information into a mosaic which reveals material information 
(Cheynel and Levine 2020). 
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Lastly, this study is also relevant to policymakers, as it sheds light on a broader debate 
regarding tax transparency—for example, whether private country-by-country reporting should 
be public (European Commission 2016).5 Anecdotally, many critics have serious reservations 
as to whether the public can interpret—and thereby effectively utilize—tax returns, fearing that 
disclosing them might generate more confusion than clarity (OECD 2011, PwC 2017, Tax 
Executives Institute 2002b). I provide insights into this debate by showing empirical evidence 
that after the disclosure of bottom-line items on income tax return, less-sophisticated investors 
will be less disadvantaged relative to more-sophisticated ones because the costs of processing 
tax return information are lower. This result is in line with the conjecture of Lenter et al. 
(2003)’s conjecture that partial tax return disclosure of bottom-line items only can improve 
information flow while inducing less proprietary cost than extensive disclosure. As less-
sophisticated investors can be used as a proxy for the general public, I provide policy insights 
into whether tax return disclosure is understandable, and thus indirectly indicate whether this 
key precondition for effective tax transparency policies can be met. 
2  Institutional setting and related literature 
2.1 Mandatory disclosure 
As part of a global push to improve tax transparency, the ATO has begun to publish annual 
partial tax return information about specific corporate entities. All public corporations with 
total income exceeding AUD 100 million are subject to ATO disclosure.6 The first mandatory 
disclosure was published on the ATO’s website on December 17, 2015 for the year 2013–2014 
(see Figure 1 for timeline).7  Subsequent disclosures have been published every December. 
 
5 For example, the director of OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy and Administration stated that an Australian-style 
disclosure might be misleading and do big damage unfairly, and would complicate country-by-country reporting 
(Khadem 2014). 
6 See section 3C of the Taxation Administration Act 1953. AUD 1 = USD .7129 on December 17, 2015, AUD 
100 million = USD 71.29 million on December 17, 2015. 
7 See https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/Large-business/In-detail/Tax-transparency/ for links to Excel files of the 
tax disclosure. 
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Three numbers (without amendments and settlements) are taken directly from the tax returns 
and made public: total income (gross accounting revenue of the tax-consolidated group), 
taxable income, and tax payable. The disclosure is highly standardized; the ATO publishes on 
its website an Excel file including all company names, Australian Business Numbers (ABN), 
and the three bottom-line numbers. All major media in Australia—for example, the Financial 
Review, the Australian, the Age, and the Advertiser—report this disclosure.  
While the ATO argued that the mandatory disclosure would increase transparency, the 
Australian Financial Market Association (AFMA) (2013) predicted otherwise: it “may actually 
undermine the public’s understanding of the tax system through being misleading, as opposed 
to informative.” Some of the confusion would result from the differences between tax and 
financial accounting requirements, especially in Australia, where there is low book-tax 
conformity (Alford et al. 1993). Total income is hard to infer from financial statements, as the 
unit of tax consolidation (which requires 100% ownership) is different from the unit of 
accounting consolidation (which requires 50% ownership). Moreover, taxable income and 
taxes payable differ from similarly labeled items reported on the income statement (see 
Appendices B and C). The first release of mandatory disclosures led many media outlets to 
report—without further investigation—that many large corporations paid no income taxes.8 
Given the severe effect on public perception, even the ATO itself and the AFMA had to educate 
the public that paying no taxes does not necessarily equate to tax avoidance.9 To complement 
this limited mandatory tax disclosure, the ATO introduced a voluntary disclosure policy—the 
Tax Transparency Code (TTC)—and provided guidance for such disclosure in February 2016 
 
8For example, see “579 companies paid no income tax: ATO” (The Advertiser 2015); “Coalition urged to target 
big players” (The Age 2015); “Pressure on for company tax reform” (The West Australian 2015). 
9  ATO officials involved in this effort included Acting Second Commissioner Jeremy Hirschhorn, Tax 
Commissioner Chris Jordan, and Assistant Treasurer Kelly O'Dwyer. An AFMA spokesman also explained that 
many investment banks did not pay tax because of losses carried forward from the financial crisis (Rose and 
Khadem 2015). For a recent explanation see https://www.ato.gov.au/Media-centre/Media-releases/Corporate-
Tax-Transparency-report-shines-spotlight-on-tax-take/.  
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(see section 5.5).  
<insert  Figure 1 here> 
2.2 Tax transparency and public disclosure 
Tax returns are used by some investors because they provide decision-useful information 
beyond financial statements (Cussatt and Demere 2019; Demere 2018). Hoopes et al. (2018) 
and Chen (2017) find a negative market reaction to the ATO’s tax-return disclosure for 
disclosing firms, both at the time of the mandate’s announcement and at the time of disclosure. 
Kays (2018) finds evidence that firms use voluntary disclosure to offset the potential costs of 
mandatory disclosure. Cussatt and Demere (2019) report that U.S. markets react to selective 
public tax return disclosures regarding pension funding and expenses. But these studies do not 
focus on the informational effect, and the price reaction is not necessarily caused by the content 
of the disclosure.  
Another stream of public disclosure literature focuses on public country-by-country 
reporting (CbCR) regarding financial institutions, which requires a per-country breakdown of 
tax expenses. Unlike tax returns, which focus on cash tax payments to a single country, public 
CbCR may report worldwide accrual-based information.10 Dutt et al. (2019) report that there 
is no market reaction to the decision to adopt public CbCR in the financial sector. In a similar 
setting, Johannesen and Larsen (2016) show that European legislation requiring extractive 
industries to disclose their payments to governments on a country-by-country basis reduces 
firm value; however, the effect of tax information cannot be disentangled from that of other 
information such as bribes and potential anticorruption enforcement actions and penalties. 
Relatedly, Huang et al. (2021) find that private CbCR increases value-relevance of tax surprise 
for investors and the accuracy of analysts’ effective tax rate forecast. 
 
10 Tax on profit or loss on an accounting consolidation basis must be reported.  
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3  Theory and hypotheses development 
As information transparency with regard to tax is a subset of the overall information 
environment, I expect that tax return disclosure will at least partially affect the general 
information asymmetry among investors.  
Tax return information is incrementally informative, especially in countries with low 
book-tax conformity. From the tax return, taxes payable informs about the amount, timing, and 
uncertainty of expected future cash flows (Kays 2018); and taxable income informs about 
profitability (Hanlon et al. 2005), earnings growth (Lev and Nissim 2004), earnings persistence 
(Hanlon 2005), and firm risk (Dhaliwal et al. 2017; Henry 2018). Relatedly, the book-tax 
difference reflects management discretion about accruals (Hanlon 2005). 
Before the mandatory tax return disclosure, investors could obtain tax information from 
financial statements or private communication channels. Estimating tax return information 
from financial statements is a difficult task (Hanlon 2003); it may require extensive analysis 
(McGill and Outslay 2004) and complex calculations (Graham 1996). Additionally, some 
investors have private information sources such as insiders (Chi et al. 2014), institutional 
investors in syndicated loans (Demere 2018), credit rating agencies, or conference call 
attendees (Bushee, Jung, and Miller 2011; Ehinger, Lee, Stomberg, and Towery 2020). Without 
public disclosure, some investors are better informed than others because they can better 
reconstruct the financial statements, or have private communication channels. 
Theoretically, public disclosure can give all investors equal access to information and 
therefore reduces information asymmetry (Diamond 1985; Verrecchia 1982). Empirical 
evidence shows that several disclosure regulations—such as Regulation Fair Disclosure (reg 
FD), the SEC’s segment disclosure, and disclosure requirements for cash flow statement—
reduce information asymmetry among investors (Eleswarapu et al. 2004; Frino and Jones 2005; 
Greenstein and Sami 1994).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3921331
9 
 
 However,  investors need to translate the public disclosure into new private information 
in the process of interpretation. Different investors may have different information processing 
costs in time and effort, and have different processing abilities according to their sophistication 
(a function of expertise, experience, resources, and attention).11 Therefore,  some investors may 
benefit more from public disclosure than others ( Bloomfield 2002; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; 
Kalay 2015), especially when public disclosure is hard to process. In that case, public 
information can concentrate the allocation of private information to a subset of investors 
(Lundholm 1991), and sophisticated investors can exploit the new private information they 
have gathered (Kim and Verrecchia 1997). Empirical evidence documents that in some cases, 
such as quarterly reports and mandatory stress-tests for EU banks, public disclosure increases 
information asymmetry (Bischof and Daske 2013; Ertimur 2007).  
In sum, it is not clear ex ante whether tax return disclosures increase or decrease 
information asymmetry. Hence, I state the following hypothesis in a nondirectional form: 
H1: After the mandatory tax return disclosure, information asymmetry changes for 
disclosing firms. 
The change in information asymmetry predicted under H1 should vary among firms 
with differing information environments. If less-sophisticated investors benefit from the tax 
information (i.e., the main effect under H1 decreases information asymmetry), information 
asymmetry should decrease more in poor than in rich information environments, as the 
disclosure mandate generates more “news” for less-sophisticated investors, from which they 
benefit disproportionately (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). This reduces the relatively high 
information asymmetry that exists before public disclosure, when more-sophisticated investors 
enjoy a greater information advantage (Bhattacharya et al. 2013; Diamond 1985). 
 
11 Information processing cost includes awareness cost (monitoring for a disclosure’s existence), acquisition cost 
(extracting signals), and integration cost (analyzing implications) (Blankespoor et al. 2020).  
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If, on the other hand, less-sophisticated investors do not benefit from the tax 
information (i.e., the main effect under H1 increases information asymmetry), information 
asymmetry should increase more in poor than in rich information environments, as more-
sophisticated investors expand their advantage by using the new information, whereas less-
sophisticated investors still do not benefit. This leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2: After the mandatory tax return disclosure, information asymmetry changes more 
for firms with poor information environments. 
4  DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 Sample selection and data collection 
I use a sample of Australian public firms to compare the change in information asymmetry 
after the tax disclosure for disclosing and nondisclosing firms. For a clean setting, I test only 
the effect of the first year of mandatory disclosure (for the tax year 2013–2014).12 Otherwise, 
the postdisclosure period of the first mandatory disclosure and the predisclosure period of the 
second mandatory disclosure would overlap. Also, the first ATO mandatory disclosure in 
December 2015 had higher public attention and was more salient to unsophisticated investors.   
The sample consists of all Australian-headquartered listed firms for the period 
December 2014–November 2016. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. I start with 
all Australian securities in the Thomson Reuters Datastream. I restrict the sample to Australian 
headquartered firms to avoid the home bias of the capital market. In the next step, I identify 
the sample for testing H1. I classify the Australian firms into firms with mandatory tax 
disclosure (treatment group) and firms without mandatory disclosure (control group). I match 
all firms with ATO mandatory disclosure (identifier: ABN) using the linking table for ISIN 
 
12 It is also possible that firms might have restructured their operations to book income in their Australian 
subsidiaries rather than bill from overseas, in response to the Multinational Anti-Avoidance Law (MAAL) 
implemented on January 1, 2016. This effect might start to show tax returns for 2014–2015, which were published 
on December 9, 2016. Thus, my sample period avoids this effect. Also, MAAL is an extension of a general anti-
avoidance rule and does not affect the same group of firms as mandatory disclosure does. With a difference-in-
difference design, MAAL would pose less concern about confounding effects.  
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and ABN from Orbis. Matched firms serve as the treatment group, and the rest of Australian-
headquartered listed firms serve as the control group. After removing all firms with missing 
data for variables used in the regressions, I have a final sample of 759 firms, of which 149 have 
mandatory disclosure.  
For the main test, all market variables are downloaded from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. To generate market-related variables, I download daily data on bid price, ask price, 
trading volume, shares outstanding, market value, and return index to generate the quarterly 
median. The daily observations of these variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
For cross-sectional tests, I first collect data for variables that represent a firm’s general 
and tax-specific information environment. I collect the number of analysts following from 
IBES, and the ESG score from Thomson Reuters Eikon, both as of December 2015. Following 
Kvaal and Nobes (2013), I hand collect firms’ 2014 financial statements and calculate the tax 
disaggregation index, which represents the level of detail in the tax reconciliation on financial 
statements. This disaggregation index explains the differences between the actual tax expense 
and the theoretical tax expense based on pretax profit. To test whether the effects of tax 
disclosure differ across firms with different ownership structures and media attention, I collect 
individual ownership data from Thomson Reuters Eikon, and collect all newspaper reports 
about ATO’s mandatory disclosure in the month of the disclosure date and the month after 
from Factiva.  
To compare the bottom-line items on the tax return disclosure with related items on 
financial statements, I merge the ATO data with the yearly (2014) data in Compustat Global. 
Compustat ensures that the financial data are from consolidated accounts, which are more 
comparable to the tax consolidated accounts presented on tax returns than unconsolidated ones.   
In additional tests, I also explore voluntary disclosure. I classify firms according to 
whether the firm has a voluntary commitment and/or disclosure. Although the ATO website 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3921331
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lists firms that are voluntarily committed on the date of retrieval, the historical list is not 
accessible.13 To recover historical TTC commitments (i.e., those signed between the first and 
second mandatory disclosures), I use the internet archive "wayback machine" to recover the 
list as of November 18, 2016, which is close to the start of the second year of mandatory 
disclosure.14 For voluntary actual disclosures, I hand-collect voluntary disclosure reports from 
companies’ websites or the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) announcement website.15 
The final sample consists of 759 firms. 149 firms have mandatory tax return disclosure, 
of which 20 firms have a commitment to additional voluntary disclosure, and 11 have actual 
voluntary disclosure (see section 5.5).  
<insert Table 1 here> 
4.2 Research design 
4.2.1 Dependent variable: bid-ask spread 
Bid-ask spread is generally accepted as a proxy for information asymmetry (Amiram et al. 
2016; Blankespoor et al. 2014; Christensen et al. 2013; Stoll 1989). It is assumed that the 
market consists of more- and less-sophisticated traders (Copeland and Galai 1983; Glosten and 
Milgrom 1985). Less-sophisticated (uninformed or liquidity) traders respond to informed 
trading by demanding a higher return acquired through a widening bid-ask spread. In other 
words, the bid-ask spread reflects the perceived risk of information asymmetry. One advantage 
of this proxy is that bid-ask spread does not rely on accounting-based valuation models or 
forecasts (Li 2010), and is less prone to anticipation effects.  
4.2.2 Primary tests: mandatory disclosure and information asymmetry among investors 
I use a difference-in-difference design and estimate the linear regression model on firm-quarter 




15 Although the ATO publishes the linked list of TTC reports, some links are invalid. 
16 I do not use a regression discontinuity design because the threshed indicator, total income, is observable only 
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estimation period is from the four quarters before the mandatory ATO disclosure (Dec 2014 to 
Nov 2015) to the four quarters after it (Dec 2015 to Nov 2016). I use four quarters because, 
according to Boone (1998), results from short event windows are biased, as information 
asymmetry usually increases shortly before the disclosure and declines afterward. Therefore a 
longer window is better for studying the permanent effect.  
The treatment group consists of firms that are subject to mandatory disclosure (i.e., 
those with more than AUD 100 million total income), and the control group consists of 
Australian public firms not subject to such disclosure.17  
To mitigate the concern that mandatorily disclosing firms are not comparable to 
nondisclosing firms, I use a multivariate matching method. Following Demere (2018), Joshi et 
al. (2020), and McMullin and Schonberger (2018), I use entropy balancing (Hainmueller 2012) 
to adjust for the underlying determinants of bid-ask spreads without a first-stage regression. 
Putting continuous weights on control firms balances covariates between the treatment and the 
control groups. Because in panel data the weight must be constant within the firm for every 
year, and quarterly market data are volatile, I generate weights for control firms using the 
average weight of four predisclosure quarters from entropy balancing.18  
As Stoll (1989) indicates that bid-ask spreads have multiplicative relationships with the 
explanatory variables, I follow previous literature and use a log-liner specification ( Boone 
 
for disclosing firms. Also, total income is hard to proxy from accounting numbers as it is different from accounting 
revenue.   
17 One caveat worth noting is that firms may strategically bunch below the reporting threshold to avoid mandatory 
disclosure. Hoopes et al. (2018) use the tax administration data and look at the distribution of reported total 
incomes around the disclosure threshold and find evidence of this behavior, although this problem is less 
pronounced for public firms. In an untabulated robustness test, I exclude firms that might be doing this. Recall 
that total income is publicly observable only for disclosing firms and hard to proxy from accounting numbers as 
it differs from accounting revenue. My exclusion criterion therefore is total revenue, the financial statement item 
closest to total income. I drop nondisclosing firms that have a total income higher than the first quartile of 
disclosing firms’ total income. I repeat the main tests and the result is robust.   
18 The result is consistent with the result of using weights from the quarter before mandatory disclosure. The trends 
are more parallel using weights calculated as the average of the four quarters. As a robustness check, I also 
compute counterfactuals using the synthetic control method following Hail et al. (2020) and  Fernandes et al. 
(2016). The result is robust. 
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1998; Greenstein and Sami 1994; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) as shown in equation (1) to test 
the relationship between bid-ask spread and mandatory disclosure stated in H1.19  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑡𝑖 =  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + ɛ     (1)             
The dependent variable, Log (Bid-Ask Spread), is the log-transformed median of firm 
i’s bid-ask spread during quarter t. Bid-ask spread is calculated as the difference between bid 
and ask quotes (Ask−Bid) divided by midpoint ((Ask+Bid)/2). This relative bid-ask spread 
suffers less from the tick size difference problem than the absolute spread and facilitates cross-
sectional comparison. Taking the median of the quarterly value attempts to mitigate the effects 
of outliers and special events, and thus capture the “steady state.” Firm and time fixed effects 
(𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼𝑡) alleviate the concern that firm characteristics or common shocks drive the results.
20   
Post Mandatory Disclosure is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i is on the list 
of ATO mandatory disclosures and quarter t occurs after the release of the disclosure (quarters 
beginning in or after December 2015), and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on this indicator, 𝛽1, 
is the main variable of interest. 21  I therefore identify the effect of the ATO mandatory 
disclosure by comparing within-firm variation of disclosing firms to that of nondisclosing firms. 
This identification strategy mitigates concerns that unobserved firm characteristics drive my 
results. 
Following extant studies (including Bischof and Daske 2013; Greenstein and Sami 
1994; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Stoll 1989), I employ the following control variables: size 
(market value), share turnover (trading volume divided by shares outstanding), and return 
variability (standard deviation of stock return). Size and trading volume are associated with the 
 
19 Using an alternative proxy, the percentage of zero trading days, yields directionally consistent, though less 
significant (10% level), results. The intuition is that decreasing information asymmetry increases liquidity among 
investors, so firms with higher (lower) percentages of zero-trading days reflect higher (lower) information 
asymmetry. 
20 The result holds without firm fixed effect (i.e., if I drop firm fixed effects and add the main effect Mandatory 
Disclosure—which is one for mandatory disclosing firms and zero otherwise—into the regression).  This mitigates 
the concern that a two-way fixed effect may bias the results. 
21 The firm fixed effects subsume the main effect for disclosing firms, and the quarter fixed effects subsume the 
main effect for periods after the tax return disclosure. 
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quality and quantity of information production in financial markets, and return variability is 
associated with the possibility that more-sophisticated traders are more active when the firm’s 
uncertainty is higher (Bhattacharya et al. 2013). I use the log of the quarterly median lagged by 
four quarters (Bischof and Daske 2013). 
4.2.3 Cross-sectional tests and exploratory tests 
In order to test H2 and mitigate the concern that the change of information asymmetry is caused 
by other factors, in the second set of analyses, I explore the cross-sectional determinants of the 
change in the bid-ask spread. To ensure that the effect is driven by ATO mandatory disclosure 
and to alleviate the concern about the control group, I use only mandatory disclosure firms.  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 ∗
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖/𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + ɛ                                           (2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
Following Hail et al. (2020), I interact 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖  with firm 
characteristics or potential information content that investors learn. The interaction term is the 
variable of interest. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 Panel A shows descriptive statistics of all firms before entropy balancing. 149 firms 
are on the list of ATO mandatory disclosure (treatment) firms, leading to 1192 observations. 
Panel B shows descriptive statistics after entropy balancing. As I implement entropy balancing 
on 1st, 2nd, and 3rd moments (mean, variance, and skewness), the covariates (market value, share 
turnover, and return variability) for the four quarters before the mandatory disclosure are 
similar between the treatment group and the entropy reweighted control group.  
The mean for Log(Bid-ask spread) for the treatment group before disclosure is -4.15, 
while it is -4.25 for the entropy reweighted control group. After disclosure, while Log(Bid-ask 
spread) increases significantly to -4.11 for the entropy reweighted control group, firms in the 
treatment group remain stable at -4.14. The control variables, Log(Market Value), Log(Share 
Turnover), and Log(Return Variability), remain relatively comparable before and after 




<insert Table 2 here> 
5  Results and discussion 
5.1 Graphical evidence 
In Figure 2, I present visual evidence of the trend in information asymmetry and plot the Log 
(Bid-ask spread) before and after the mandatory ATO disclosure using entropy reweighted 
control groups. Panel A shows the comparison between the ATO mandatory disclosure group 
and the entropy reweighted control group. After the December 2015 mandatory disclosure, 
disclosing firms show a decrease in the bid-ask spread. Interestingly, this effect does not occur 
immediately. Panel B uses a synthetic control group as an alternative way, and I also observe 
the decrease in the bid-ask spread for mandatory disclosing firms, compared to non-disclosing 
firms, after the ATO disclosure.  
<insert Figure 2 here> 
5.2 Primary tests: mandatory disclosure and information asymmetry among investors 
Table 3 column (3) presents the results from estimating Equation (1). I use a difference-in-
difference design to test the change in bid-ask spread four quarters before and four quarters 
after the first ATO mandatory disclosure. The coefficient of Post Mandatory Disclosure is 
negative and significant at the 5% level (-0.126), providing evidence that the introduction of 
mandatory tax return disclosure decreases information asymmetry by about 13.43 percent 
(𝑒0.126-1). The control variable Log(Return Variability) is significant and has the predicted 
sign.  
In column (3), the firm fixed effects subsume the main effect for disclosing firms, and 
the quarter fixed effects subsume the main effect for periods after the tax return disclosure. In 
column (2), I drop firm fixed effects and add the main effect Mandatory Disclosure—which is 
one for mandatorily disclosing firms and zero otherwise—into the regression. The result holds, 
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mitigating the concern that a two-way fixed effect may bias results. Column (1) reports the 
result with no fixed effect; this result is also robust. 22     
Taken together, the results suggest that bottom-line numbers of tax returns were to a 
large extent private information known only to a subset of investors before mandatory 
disclosure and are now accessible and understandable to all investors. Note that mandatory 
disclosure may not alone cause the informational effect; it may be paired with other pieces of 
information.23 
<insert Table 3 here> 
5.3 Cross-sectional tests of mandatory disclosure firms: firm characteristics  
5.3.1 Information environment 
To examine whether the effect differs for firms with rich and poor information environments, 
in Table 4 I allow it to differ across firms’ information environments following Hail et al. 
(2020). Following Weber (2009), I use the level of analyst coverage as a proxy for the firm’s 
general information flow. Analyst following (resources devoted to information collection) is a 
primary source of information for outsiders (Frankel and Li 2004). Column (1) shows that Post 
Mandatory Disclosure*High Number of Analysts Following is positively related to the bid-ask 
spread, indicating that tax return information is more useful when other information is less 
available.  
In the same vein, following Kvaal and Nobes (2013) I construct a variable measuring 
the degree of detail in the reconciliation of pretax profit to tax expense on financial statements. 
This variable partly represents the informativeness of the tax information provided in the 
financial statements. Column (2) shows that Post Mandatory Disclosure*High Disaggregation 
Index is also positively related to the bid-ask spread, although only moderately significantly. 
 
22 I use yearly data in Compustat global, as not all Australian listed firms have public quarterly reports. However, 
the main tests use quarterly observations. This limits my ability to add additional controls. 
23  From the policy perspective, it does not matter whether bottom-line items alone can reduce information 
asymmetry, as policymakers achieve transparency without extensive disclosure of proprietary information.  
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This result suggests that the mandatory disclosure is less useful when firms already disclose 
significant tax information in their financial statements.24  
In general, firms with poor information environments experience a bigger reduction in 
information asymmetry, in accord with H2. Relatedly, Kim et al. (2020) find that analysts 
misestimate tax information only for firms with a poor information environment.  
5.3.2 Individual investors 
If mandatory tax disclosure levels the playing field, individual investors (who are generally 
regarded as less sophisticated) benefit the most from mandatory disclosure, and thus the effect 
will be more pronounced for firms with high individual ownership. Accordingly, I interact Post 
Mandatory Disclosure with High Individual Ownership, which is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the firm’s individual ownership is above the median and zero otherwise. Table 4 column 
(3) shows that the coefficient of this interaction is negative and moderately significant, 
indicating that such firms do see greater reductions of information asymmetry after the 
mandatory disclosure. 
5.3.3 Attention and private information acquisition 
It is possible that mandatory disclosure makes disclosing firms more visible and 
motivates less-sophisticated investors to acquire more private information about them, so that 
the reduction in information asymmetry is not caused by the disclosure. To partially alleviate 
this concern, I compare firms with and without media attention in the month of the disclosure 
date and the month after when ATO mandatory disclosure was reported by major Australian 
newspapers. Nineteen firms in my sample were mentioned explicitly in major newspapers 
around the ATO disclosure date. Table 4 column (4) shows that Post Mandatory 
 
24 Firms may also change their behaviors, either operations or reporting. Untabulated tests show that disclosing 
firms experience a small decrease in tax payments (scaled by total income) from the first to the second ATO 
mandatory disclosure, consistent with Hoopes et al. (2018). Regarding tax reporting, note that on average, 
disclosing firms’ disaggregation index is relatively constant from 2014 to 2016, providing some evidence that tax 
reporting is not changed.   
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Disclosure*High Media Attention is positively related to information asymmetry, indicating 
that the effect of mandatory disclosure is less pronounced for firms that had high media 
attention. This result is inconsistent with the notion that the effect comes from media-triggered 
increased acquisition of private information.  
<insert Table 4 here> 
5.4 Exploratory test of mandatory disclosure firms: book-tax gap 
Just what kind of content contributes to the change in information asymmetry? The information 
shock caused by tax return disclosure is the difference between the book number on the 
financial statements and the tax number disclosed on the newly public tax returns. If 
unsophisticated investors previously used financial statements to approximate tax return 
information, and can now base better decisions on the new, additional information, the 
information asymmetry reduction should be correlated with the gap between book and tax 
numbers. 25   
I follow Boone (1998) and construct two ex-post proxies for the book-tax gap (value 
on the tax return minus the value on the financial statements).26 I measure the book-tax gap as 
the absolute value of (1) the difference between the tax payable on the tax return and the tax 
expense on the financial statements;27 and (2) the difference between the total income on the 
tax return and the revenue on financial statements.28 Both proxies are scaled by total assets. I 
use the absolute value because both positive and negative book-tax gaps represent relate to 
 
25 The main differences in Australia include tax credits, uncertain tax positions, foreign activity, provision to 
return adjustments, consolidation differences, and intraperiod tax allocation (Hanlon 2003; Kays 2021; Tran 2015). 
26 I construct book-tax gap only for revenue and tax expense, not taxable income, as taxable income is usually 
estimated by grossing up tax expense by statutory tax rate, not directly taken from financial statements, and 
therefore is subject to estimation errors.  
27 I use tax expense instead of current tax payable and cash tax paid for the following reasons. Practically, 
Compustat’s data quality for current tax payable and cash tax paid is poor. Conceptually, tax expense contains the 
discretion and complexity for information asymmetry between managers and investors to persist (Dhaliwal et al. 
2004). Also, unlike cash tax paid, tax expense affects accounting earnings. In addition, tax expense is more likely 
to be used by less sophisticated investors, as it is disclosed in more prominent sections, appears in analysts’ reports, 
and is sometimes mentioned in management reports.    
28 Recall that total income disclosed by the ATO is not net income (profit), but gross revenue for the tax 
consolidation group. The result is consistent if I use sales instead of revenue on financial statements.  
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information asymmetry that can be lessened.  
Table 5 shows the results. In column (1), I interact Post Mandatory Disclosure with the 
book-tax gap in tax expense (Book-Tax Gap: Tax Expense), and the results show that a larger 
gap leads to a greater reduction in bid-ask spread (coefficient -4.94, significant at the 1% level). 
As column (2) shows, the book-tax gap in revenue (Book-Tax Gap: Revenue) does not seem to 
be associated with any decrease in the bid-ask spread. 
These results indicate that the postdisclosure decline in the bid-ask spread increases 
with the absolute book-tax gap of tax expense. These tests increase my confidence that the 
reduction in information asymmetry is caused by mandatory tax disclosure, instead of 
confounding factors.  
<insert Table 5 here> 
5.5 Additional analyses: voluntary commitment and disclosure 
It is possible that the reduction in information asymmetry is caused by later, additional 
voluntary disclosure rather than by the mandatory disclosure. In this section, I explore whether 
the effect on information asymmetry differs for firms with a voluntary commitment and/or 
disclosure. 
Such firms follow two steps. First, they commit in advance to disclosing voluntary 
reports, with the list of committed firms published on the ATO website. Second, they publish 
their tax transparency reports following ATO guidance, which includes the reconciliation of 
financial statement numbers and tax return numbers.29  
 
29 The voluntary disclosure policy was adopted after the mandatory disclosure mandate. Firms first commit to 
disclosing, and the list of committed firms is published on the ATO website. Firms then disclose at a later date, 
following the ATO guidance. The extent to which firms would respond to this voluntary disclosure “nudge” is ex-
ante unclear. As mandatory disclosure is incomplete (including only three numbers), it may trigger extensive 
voluntary disclosure to complement and explain it (Guay et al. 2016). Conversely, firms may be reluctant to 
disclose additional information if they expect that too few investors will understand it (Fishman and Hagerty 2003) 
or the proprietary costs are high.  
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The mere commitment to voluntary disclosure, even when no information has yet been 
disclosed, is often used by insiders to differentiate their firms from others, and this signal adds 
to the information set of outsiders (Akerlof 1970; Spence 1973, 2002). The commitment to 
disclose has a permanent effect on information asymmetry, as it reduces agency costs (Baiman 
and Verrecchia 1996; Rock 2002; Stulz 2009; Verrecchia 1999) or changes the incentives of 
sophisticated investors to collect private information (Barron and Qu 2014; Brown et al. 
2004).30  
Regarding ex-post transparency reports, recall that mandatory disclosure contains only 
three numbers. This incompleteness may contribute to imprecise knowledge of the firm’s value 
(Duffie and Lando 2001; Lu et al. 2010) and thus increase its incentive for voluntary disclosure 
to offset any negative effect (Frankel and Li 2004; Guay et al. 2016). Kays (2018) finds that 
voluntary tax disclosure is issued to complement ATO’s partial tax return disclosure, especially 
by firms with large book-tax differences. I therefore expect that among firms with mandatory 
tax return disclosure, those with voluntary disclosure and/or voluntary commitment will have 
lower information asymmetry following the mandatory disclosure than do firms without 
voluntary commitment. 
To test this expectation, I follow Bischof and Daske (2013) and partition mandatory 
disclosure firms according to whether they are also voluntarily committed to disclosure 
following the TTC.  
 
30 In an experimental study, Barron and Qu (2014) argue that if informed investors know that a forthcoming public 
disclosure may decrease their information advantage, they will exploit private information more aggressively 
before the disclosure. The private information aggregation arising from increased competition among informed 
investors is further passed on to the market, which reduces information asymmetry. Brown et al. (2004) show a 
different mechanism for the reduction in information asymmetry: informed investors reduce their search for 
private information because the anticipated disclosure reduces the expected benefit of the information. In addition, 
with more public information, uninformed trading increases more than informed trading because informed 
investors may be risk averse or capital constrained. In this way, the risk of uninformed investors trading against 
informed investors is reduced.  
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𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 & 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 & 𝑁𝑜 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + ɛ               (3)         
 
Post Mandatory Disclosure & Voluntary Commitment (Post Mandatory Disclosure & No 
Voluntary Commitment) denotes whether a mandatory disclosure firm is voluntarily committed 
(not committed) to a TTC report between the first and second mandatory disclosures (i.e., from 
December 2015 to December 2016). The coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 represent the effects with and 
without voluntary commitment respectively, and I perform a Wald test for the difference 
between the two coefficients. 
Similarly, I additionally partition mandatory disclosure firms according to whether they 
actually disclose TTC reports between the first and the second mandatory disclosures, as in 
equation (4).  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 & 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 & 𝑁𝑜 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + ɛ                   (4)       
  
In this regression I add the indicator variables Voluntary Disclosure and No Voluntary 
Disclosure. The former takes the value one if the firm has voluntary disclosure of tax 
transparency reports from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016 and zero otherwise, and the latter is the 
opposite. Again, if the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are different, the effect differs for firms with 
voluntary disclosure and firms without.31   
Table 6 shows the results. For convenience in comparison, column (1) repeats the 
results from the main analysis for mandatory disclosure. Column (2) compares the effect on 
 
31 Although entropy balancing can partially alleviate self-selection bias for voluntarily committing and disclosing 
firms, it is not perfect. One potential way to test the effect of voluntary commitment and voluntary disclosure is a 
staggered difference-in-difference analysis with the commitment and disclosure dates. However, this procedure 
is challenging for the following reasons. First, I cannot find firms’ commitment dates, as the website lists the 
committed firms as of the date of retrieval. Second, voluntary disclosure can be included in other reports (e.g., 
annual reports or sustainability reports) or published at the same time with other reports. Thus, it is difficult to 
tease out the effect of voluntary disclosure. 
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mandatory disclosure firms with and without voluntary commitment, as in Equation (3). Only 
the coefficient estimate for Post Mandatory Disclosure & No Voluntary Commitment is 
significant, at the 5% level with the value -0.127, a result that is similar to the overall effect of 
Post Mandatory Disclosure. I do not observe a statistically significant difference between firms 
with and without voluntary commitment, but given the relatively small number of firms (20) 
with voluntary commitments, these results should be interpreted with caution. 
Column (3) further splits the mandatory disclosure group into firms with and without 
voluntary disclosure as in Equation (4). The 11 firms with voluntary disclosure do not show  
change in information asymmetry compared to the control group, but firms without voluntary 
disclosure exhibit a decrease in information asymmetry relative to the control group, with a 
significant coefficient of -0.139. The F-test shows that the coefficients of Post Mandatory 
Disclosure & Voluntary Disclosure and Post Mandatory Disclosure & No Voluntary 
Disclosure are statistically different.  
Overall, Table 6 suggests that, surprisingly, neither voluntary commitment nor 
voluntary disclosure is associated with a decrease in information asymmetry. One potential 
reason is that firms with voluntary disclosure and voluntary commitment already had little 
information asymmetry before the mandatory disclosure; another is that, since voluntary 
disclosure is not verified and voluntary commitment is not legally binding, investors may doubt 
their credibility.   
These results mitigate the concern that the reduction in information asymmetry is 
caused by voluntary disclosure instead of mandatory disclosure, and are consistent with the 
results from the cross-sectional test of the information environment. 
<insert Table 6 here> 
5.6 Additional analyses: information intermediaries 
Analysts play an important role in disseminating information. In untabulated tests, I use analyst 
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forecast data from IBES and calculate forecast range (measured as the difference between the 
highest and lowest analysts’ forecasts, scaled by the mean) for quarterly earnings per share. 
From the descriptive statistics, I observe that the forecast range of mandatorily disclosing firms 
narrows more than that of nondisclosing firms after the time of disclosure.   
Media also reported or discussed numbers from the mandatory disclosure: there were 
67 media articles about tax returns from December 2015 to January 2016, compared to 10 in 
the same months one year before and 59 in the same months one year after.32 Some newspaper 
articles guide readers to correctly interpret the tax return information, especially the tax rate. 
For example, on January 28, 2016, The Age published  “Public ‘education’ sought for big 
business taxes,” pointing out that effective tax rates may be lower than the headline tax rate, 
owing to R&D tax incentives, recoupment of preceding year losses, foreign exchange 
fluctuations, and overseas operations (Heath Aston and Khadem 2016) (see Appendix D).  
The above evidence indicates that information intermediaries may help to reduce 
information asymmetry among investors after the public disclosure of tax return information.   
6  Conclusion 
My findings suggest that information asymmetry among investors decreases after the ATO 
mandatory disclosure of bottom-line items on tax returns (total income, taxable income, and 
tax payable). The effect is more pronounced for firms with a poorer initial information 
environment (both general and tax-specific), firms with higher individual ownership, and firms 
with lower media attention. The magnitude of the effect is also related to the absolute difference 
between tax payable on the tax return and tax expense on the financial statements. Additional 
analyses show that the effect is concentrated among firms with only mandatory disclosure—
that is, without any voluntary commitment or voluntary disclosure.  
 
32 I searched in Factiva for articles that have at least one of the following: tax payable, tax paid, corporate tax 
transparency, tax return,or report of entity tax information. 
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Taken as a whole, the results suggest that bottom-line items on tax returns have an 
informational effect in the long run, even without further explanation and clarification. Tax 
return disclosure helps investors at large and is broadly informative, as it lowers the costs of 
acquiring tax return information. This finding contributes directly to the policy debate over 
whether to make tax return information public, and indirectly to broader tax transparency 
regimes by showing that unsophisticated investors (who may serve as a proxy for the general 
public) can understand tax return information—the precondition of tax transparency policies. 
Future research can explore what specific information less-sophisticated investors learn from 
the public disclosure of tax return information.  
Australia is at the forefront of tax transparency, so this implication may be of interest 
to policymakers globally. As disclosure of bottom-line tax return items can be broadly 
informative without including much proprietary information, it may be preferred over 
extensive tax return disclosure for tax transparency policy (Lenter et al. 2003).   
 
  




Appendix A Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Log (Bid-ask spread) Natural logarithm of the quarterly median of the daily  
bid-ask spread, lagged by four quarters, winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles daily 
 
daily  bid-ask spread =(Ask−Bid)/((Ask+Bid)/2) 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
Log(Share Turnover)  
 
Natural logarithm of the quarterly median of the daily 
share turnover divided by shares outstanding, lagged by 
four quarters, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
daily 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream  
Log(Market Value)  
 
Natural logarithm of the quarterly median of the daily 
closing market value, lagged by four quarters 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream  
Log(Return Variability)  
 
Natural logarithm of the quarterly median of the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns, lagged by four 
quarters 
Return is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles daily. 
 
(Return index− Return index [_n-1])/RI[_n-1] 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
Post Mandatory Disclosure An indicator variable that equals 1 if 
(1) the firm is on the list of ATO mandatory disclosures 
(2) quarter t occurs after the release of the disclosure 
(quarters beginning in or after December 2015); and 0 
otherwise. 
High Number of Analysts Following A dummy variable that equals 1 if the number of analyst 




High Disaggregation Index A dummy variable that equals 1 if the disaggregation 
index is above median and 0 otherwise 
 
Following Kvaal and Nobes (2013), the disaggregation 
index represents the level of detail of the reconciliation 
of tax expense to pretax profit on financial statements. 
 
The index is the product of (1 – the item fraction of the 
aggregate reconciliation items) for all the items reported 
by a company, calculated separately for positive and 
negative items, and the two products added together, 
normalized through dividing by 2∗0.368.  
 
Source: financial statements 
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High Individual Ownership A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s individual 
ownership is above median and 0 otherwise 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Eikon 
High Media Attention A dummy variable that equals 1 if the company was 
mentioned in news reports of ATO mandatory disclosure 
and 0 otherwise 
 
Source: Factiva 
Book-Tax Gap: Tax Expense 
 
The absolute value of the difference between tax payable 
on tax return and tax expense on financial statement, 
scaled by total assets on financial statement 
 
Source: Compustat, ATO website 
Book-Tax Gap: Revenue The absolute value of the difference between total 
income on tax return and revenue on financial statement, 
scaled by total assets on financial statement 
 
Source: Compustat, ATO website 
No Tax Payable  
 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has negative 
or zero tax payable on the tax return, and 0 otherwise 
 
Source: ATO website 
High Number of Subsidiaries A dummy variable that equals 1 if the number of 




Post Mandatory Disclosure & 
Voluntary Disclosure 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if  
(1) the firm is on the list of ATO mandatory disclosures, 
(2) quarter t occurs after the release of the disclosure 
(quarters beginning in or after December 2015), and (3) 
the firm has voluntary disclosure of tax transparency 
reports from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016; and 0 otherwise. 
Post Mandatory Disclosure & No 
Voluntary Disclosure 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if  
(1) the firm is on the list of ATO mandatory disclosures, 
(2) quarter t occurs after the release of the disclosure 
(quarters beginning in or after December 2015), and (3) 
the firm does not have voluntary disclosure of tax 
transparency reports from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016; and 0 
otherwise. 
Post Mandatory Disclosure & 
Voluntary Commitment 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if  
(1) the firm is on the list of ATO mandatory disclosures, 
(2) quarter t occurs after the release of the disclosure 
(quarters beginning in or after December 2015), and (3) 
the firm has a voluntary commitment to tax transparency 
reports from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016; and 0 otherwise. 
Post Mandatory Disclosure & No 
Voluntary Commitment 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if  
(1) the firm is on the list of ATO mandatory disclosures, 
(2) quarter t occurs after the release of the disclosure 
(quarters beginning in or after December 2015), and (3) 
the firm does not have a voluntary commitment to tax 
transparency reports from Dec 2015 to Dec 2016; and 0 
otherwise. 




Appendix B  
Three figures in ATO tax-return disclosure 
Total income Taxable income Taxes payable 
Gross accounting revenue 
(all) 
Operating + nonoperating 
income 
Makes no allowances for the 
costs of earning income 
The assessable income derived 
from all sources 
Allowable deductions incurred 
in gaining that income 
Taxable income * 30% 
(CTR) 
Informs about 




• Earnings growth 
• Earnings persistence 
• Operating performance 
• Firm risk 
Informs about 
• Cash outflow 
May include 
• Exempt income 
• Nonassessable income 
• Foreign-source income 
May include 
• Franking credit 
• Nondeductible items 
• Deductions allowable for 
income tax purposes (e.g., 
loss carryback) 
 
Has no simple correlation with 
total income  
Various tax offsets, e.g.: 
• R&D tax credits 
• Franking credits 
 
 
Has no simple correlation 
with taxable income  
Comparison with the 
financial statement (revenue): 
• Financial statement: 
accounting consolidation 
group (more than 50% 
ownership)  
• Tax return: tax 
consolidation group 
(100% ownership, 
directly or indirectly) 
Comparison with the financial 
statement: 
• Not disclosed on financial 
statement 
• Commonly referred to as 
book-tax difference33  
  
Comparison with the 
financial statement: 
• Not disclosed on 
financial statement 
(see Appendix C for a 
reconciliation of taxes 
payable to income tax 
expense, current tax 
expense, and cash tax 




33  According to Tran (2015), if taxable income < book income, reasons include book income of domestic 
subsidiaries with ownership in the range of (50%, 100%); book income of foreign subsidiaries with more than 50% 
ownership; share of net income after tax of associated companies with ownership in the range of (20%, 50%). If 
taxable income > book income, one reason is the dividends received from the above entities, with imputation 
credit for franked dividends. 
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Appendix C  
Explanations of Tax Transparency Code (TTC) Reports versus Financial Statements 
Panel A: Reconciliation of accounting profit to income tax expense (New information from 
financial statements is in italic) 
 
34 From accounting profit to tax expense (Kvaal & Nobes, 2013). 
Accounting profit on financial 
statements 
Accounting profit on financial 
statements 
prima facie income tax expense 
(Not necessarily using Australian tax rate) 
 
 Accounting profit-tax consolidated group 
adjusted by permanent differences  permanent differences 
  
prior year adjustment  
remeasurements of deferred tax assets and 
liabilities that do not affect pretax profit 
 
the effect of using foreign or industry-
specific tax rates 
 
 
the effect of not being able to consolidate 




tax credits, tax holidays and tax relief  
special taxes special taxes 
adjustment for equity method part of 
profit 
taxable income relating to items not 
included in profit or loss 
unspecified (tax effects of special items 
and discontinued operations) 
 
Income tax expense on financial 
statements34 
(reported after tax credits) 
 
adjusted by temporary differences 
(excluding changes in the tax loss carry 
forwards) 
temporary differences 
(excluding changes in the tax loss carry 
forwards) 
remove for prior year adjustment utilized tax loss carry forwards 
Current tax expense on financial 
statements 
Taxable income on tax return 
tax payment that will be made in 
subsequent periods 
prima facie tax payable 
tax payment from prior periods that were 
made  
 
Cash tax paid on financial statements  
adjust for differences in accounting and 
tax consolidation group 
adjust for the year of tax return, 
jurisdictions, and refund  
franking credits 
 R&D offset 





Panel B: IFRS rules and TTC rules  
IFRS (AASB) TTC  
An explanation of the relationship between 
tax expense (income) and accounting 
profit in either or both of the following 
forms: 
(i) a numerical reconciliation between tax 
expense (income) and the product of 
accounting profit multiplied by the 
applicable tax rate(s), disclosing also the 
basis on which the applicable tax rate(s) is 
(are) computed; or 
(ii) a numerical reconciliation between the 
average effective tax rate and the applicable 
tax rate, disclosing also the basis on which 
the applicable tax rate is computed; 
(section 81 c of IAS 12 and AASB 112) 
Part A: A reconciliation of accounting 
profit to income tax expense 
 
Where Australian general purpose financial 
statements are not prepared, the rate 
reconciliation should be in a “taxes paid” 
report or another document 
The disclosures required by paragraph 81(c) 
enable users of financial statements to 
understand whether the relationship 
between tax expense (income) and 
accounting profit is unusual and to 
understand the significant factors that could 
affect that relationship in the future. The 
relationship between tax expense (income) 
and accounting profit may be affected by 
such factors as revenue that is exempt from 
taxation, expenses that are not deductible in 
determining taxable profit (tax loss), the 
effect of tax losses, and the effect of foreign 
tax rates 
(section 84 of IAS 12 and AASB 112) 
 
In explaining the relationship between tax 
expense (income) and accounting profit, an 
entity uses an applicable tax rate that 
provides the most meaningful information to 
the users of its financial statements. Often, 
the most meaningful rate is the domestic 
rate of tax in the country in which the entity 
is domiciled, aggregating the tax rate 
 
 foreign tax credits 
Income tax payable to ATO Income tax payable to ATO 
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applied for national taxes with the rates 
applied for any local taxes which are 
computed on a substantially similar level of 
taxable profit (tax loss). However, for an 
entity operating in several jurisdictions, it 
may be more meaningful to aggregate 
separate reconciliations prepared using the 
domestic rate in each individual jurisdiction. 
(section 85 of IAS 12 and AASB 112) 
 Part A: A reconciliation from income tax 
expense to income tax paid or income tax 
payable 
non-temporary difference in a firm’s tax 
rate reconciliation in the income tax note 
in respect of each type of temporary 
difference, and in respect of each type of 
unused tax loss and unused tax credit: 
(i) the amount of the deferred tax assets and 
liabilities recognised in the statement of 
financial position for each period presented; 
(ii) the amount of the deferred tax income or 
expense recognised in profit or loss, if this 
is not apparent from the changes in the 
amounts recognised in the statement of 
financial position; 
(section 81 g of IAS 12 and AASB 112) 
Part A: The identification of material 
temporary and non-temporary differences 
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Appendix D  
Newspaper Article Example 
 
News 
Public 'education' sought for big business taxes 
Heath Aston, Nassim Khadem 
28 January 2016 
English 
© 2016 Copyright John Fairfax Holdings Limited. www.theage.com.au 
Treasurer Scott Morrison's advisory panel on tax has urged big business and its industry 
bodies to mount a public relations campaign to "educate" Australians on why companies 
shouldn't always pay the mandatory 30 per cent tax rate. 
The call for a PR blitz by the Board of Taxation comes as disclosure of Apple's tiny tax 
contribution in Australia - just $85 million compared to its sales of $8 billion - reignited tax 
debate as the Coalition ponders a higher or broader GST on private taxpayers. 
The Australian Tax Office revealed in December that 579 companies with combined turnover 
of $405.9 billion paid no tax in 2013/14. Apple could be heading for a zero tax bill in 2016 
due to $200 million in tax offsets on its books. 
The Board of Taxation is an arm's-length adviser to the Treasurer but critics say it is heavily 
skewed towards business, with members largely drawn from the big four accountancy firms 
and the major law firms. 
For example, the four-person working group that has proposed a PR campaign to clear up 
"common misconceptions" about corporate tax includes Ann-Maree Wolff, the head of tax at 
Rio Tinto for the Australia and Asia-Pacific region. 
Rio, along with rival BHP, took a pummelling at the Senate tax avoidance hearings last year 
over its use of a "marketing hub" in Singapore to reduce its Australian tax bill - a process 
known as the "Singapore sling". 
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Other members of the working group include Michael Andrew, the former chairman and 
chief executive of KPMG International, John Emerson, consultant at lawyers Herbert Smith 
Freehills and Neville Mitchell, a Cochlear executive who is also president of the "Group of 
100" - the peak body for Australia's senior finance executives. 
In a consultation paper on the tax transparency code requested by former treasurer Joe 
Hockey when he announced the government's multinational tax avoidance bill, the working 
group called for a "concerted and ongoing effort to raise the level of understanding of 
business taxation". 
"Businesses and industry associations have a particularly important role in educating the 
community," it said. 
"One common misconception that could usefully be addressed through public education 
concerns the reasons why effective tax rates may be lower than the headline tax rate. For 
example, many governments provide tax incentives to businesses which invest in designated 
research and development activities. Recoupment of prior year losses, exposure to foreign 
exchange fluctuations and conducting overseas operations are other factors which may have 
the effective of reducing the effective tax rate." 
The board said the Corporate Tax Association is developing an explainer document and 
News Corp reported on Wednesday that the Business Council of Australia was also poised to 
launch a tax campaign as it seeks to justify a cut in the company tax rate. 
The consultation paper has angered tax transparency campaigners as the Board of Taxation 
appears to be moving to a completely voluntary, self-assessed system of disclosure for 
companies with revenues of $500 million or more. 
Tax Justice Network spokesman Mark Zirnsak said: "What really alarms us is there is no 
verification that information submitted is not false or misleading and there are no penalties at 
all if false information is lodged. 
"If you're a highly unethical company and a tax dodger this could be an opportunity to get 
government endorsement and look legitimate by having your unchecked tax numbers on the 
list," he said.   
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Figure 2 Relation between Mandatory Disclosure and Information Asymmetry  
Panel A Information Asymmetry of ATO Mandatory Disclosure Firms and Entropy 
Reweighted Control Group 
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Table 1 Sample Selection 
 
Note: This table describes the sample selection process. For the primary tests, there are 149 mandatorily disclosing 
firms in the final sample; firms in control groups are reweighted. For cross-sectional tests, some samples are 
smaller because data are limited. 
  
Data requirements Number of firms 
All Australian securities in Thomason Reuters database 4629 
− Missing data from Thomason Reuters Datastream −2336 
− Headquarters not in Australia −541 
− Missing data for variables in the regression −993 
Final sample 759 
Of which mandatorily disclosing 149 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A Raw Data (Without Entropy Balancing) 
All firms 
  count mean sd min max 
Log(Bid-ask spread) 6,104 -2.90 1.23 -6.10 0.18 
Log(Market Value) 6,104 3.60 2.39 -1.08 11.69 
Log(Share Turnover) 6,104 -7.57 1.51 -15.19 -3.75 
Log(Return Variability) 6,104 -3.31 0.64 -6.79 -1.95 
ATO mandatory disclosure firms 
  count mean sd min max 
Log(Bid-ask spread) 1,192 -4.14 0.76 -6.10 -0.94 
Log(Market Value) 1,192 6.62 1.91 1.58 11.69 
Log(Share Turnover) 1,192 -6.69 1.33 -12.41 -4.49 
Log(Return Variability) 1,192 -3.86 0.49 -5.15 -2.07 
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Panel B Entropy-Balanced Control Group 
 
ATO mandatory disclosure firms, 4 quarters before mandatory disclosure 
 Total weight count mean sd min max 
Log(Bid-ask spread) 596 596 -4.15 0.77 -6.10 -1.50 
Log(Market Value) 596 596 6.64 1.86 1.81 11.58 
Log(Share Turnover) 596 596 -6.71 1.31 -12.41 -4.54 
Log(Return Variability) 596 596 -3.94 0.48 -5.15 -2.07 
Entropy reweighted control firms, 4 quarters before mandatory disclosure 
 Total weight count mean sd min max 
Log(Bid-ask spread) 2456 596 -4.25 0.75 -5.66 0.15 
Log(Market Value) 2456 596 6.62 1.87 -1.02 9.64 
Log(Share Turnover) 2456 596 -6.73 1.26 -15.19 -4.18 
Log(Return Variability) 2456 596 -3.97 0.57 -6.79 -2.00 
ATO mandatory disclosure firms, 4 quarters after mandatory disclosure 
 Total weight count mean sd min max 
Log(Bid-ask spread) 596 596 -4.14 0.75 -6.06 -0.94 
Log(Market Value) 596 596 6.59 1.96 1.58 11.69 
Log(Share Turnover) 596 596 -6.66 1.36 -12.16 -4.49 
Log(Return Variability) 596 596 -3.77 0.47 -5.06 -2.19 
Entropy reweighted control firms, 4 quarters after mandatory disclosure 
 Total weight count mean sd min max 
Log(Bid-ask spread) 2456 596 -4.11 0.74 -5.36 0.18 
Log(Market Value) 2456 596 6.69 2.04 -1.08 9.87 
Log(Share Turnover) 2456 596 -6.69 1.30 -14.73 -3.75 
Log(Return Variability) 2456 596 -3.80 0.50 -6.67 -1.95 
 
Note: This table provides descriptive statistics of all variables. The sample includes all Australian firms. Panel A 
provides descriptive statistics of raw data before entropy balancing, and Panel B provides data after entropy 




Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3921331
43 
 
Table 3 Difference-in-Difference Analysis: How Mandatory Disclosure Affects Information 
Asymmetry  










        
Post Mandatory Disclosure  (Post* MandatoryDisclosure)   -0.144** -0.143** -0.126** 
 (0.0572) (0.0572) (0.0578) 
Mandatory Disclosure   0.0940** 0.0937**  
 (0.0461) (0.0460)  
Post   0.0732   
 (0.0514)   
Log(Market Value) -0.165*** -0.163*** -0.0112 
 (0.0188) (0.0187) (0.0469) 
Log(Share Turnover) -0.131*** -0.132*** -0.00632 
 (0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0222) 
Log(Return Variability) 0.480*** 0.488*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0604) (0.0611) (0.0387) 
Constant -2.141*** -2.211*** -3.733*** 
 (0.243) (0.243) (0.319) 
    
Observations 6,104 6,104 6,104 
R-squared 0.625 0.634 0.879 
quarter FE no yes yes 
firm FE no no yes 
 
Notes: The sample includes all Australian firms; all regressions are based on an entropy-balanced sample. I 
estimate the following model in columns (1) and (2): 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)
𝑡𝑖
=  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽
3
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾
𝑗
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + ɛ.         
Column (1) reports the result without any fixed effect. Column (2) reports the result without firm fixed effect, but 
with quarter fixed effect.  
In column (3), both firm fixed effect and quarter fixed effect are used. The firm fixed effects subsume the main 
effect for disclosing firms, and the quarter fixed effects subsume the main effect for periods after the tax return 
disclosure. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)
𝑡𝑖
=  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + ɛ          
The dependent variable is Log (Bid-ask spread) measured as natural logarithm of the quarterly median of the daily 
bid-ask spread, lagged by four quarters, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles daily. The variable of interest, 
Post Mandatory Disclosure, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i is on the list of ATO mandatory 
disclosures and quarter t occurs after the release of the disclosure (quarters beginning in or after December 2015), 
and 0 otherwise. I control for size, share turnover, and return variability in all specifications. Variables are defined 
in Appendix A. All regressions include firm fixed effects and quarter fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors 
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Table 4 Cross-sectional Tests of Mandatory Disclosure Firms: How Firm Characteristics affect 
the relation between Mandatory Disclosure and Information Asymmetry? 










          
Post Mandatory Disclosure*High 
Number of Analysts Following 0.152***    
 (0.0513)    
Post Mandatory Disclosure*High 
Disaggregation Index  0.0869*   
  (0.0504)   
Post Mandatory Disclosure*High 
Individual Ownership   -0.103*  
   (0.0525)  
Post Mandatory Disclosure*High 
Media Attention    0.170*** 
    (0.0447) 
Log(Market Value) -0.0720 -0.0343 -0.0673 -0.0522 
 (0.0622) (0.0604) (0.0633) (0.0579) 
Log(Share Turnover) 0.00681 0.00791 0.00380 0.0118 
 (0.0324) (0.0286) (0.0289) (0.0287) 
Log(Return Variability) 0.0831 0.0829* 0.0901* 0.0744 
 (0.0554) (0.0495) (0.0501) (0.0469) 
Constant -3.372*** -3.615*** -3.392*** -3.488*** 
 (0.474) (0.438) (0.427) (0.416) 
     
Observations 976 1,160 1,152 1,192 
R-squared   0.121 0.106 0.115 0.113 
Number of firm 122 145 144 149 
quarter FE yes yes yes yes 
firm FE yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes: The sample includes all Australian mandatory disclosure firms. I estimate the following model: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + ɛ. 
The variable of interest is the interaction term. Columns (1) and (2) interact Post Mandatory Disclosure with a 
dummy variable indicating high general information environment (measured by analyst following) and tax- 
specific environment (measured by disaggregation index). Column (3) interacts Post Mandatory Disclosure with 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has individual ownership above the median.  Column (3) interacts 
Post Mandatory Disclosure with attention, which equals 1 if the company was mentioned in news reports of ATO 
mandatory disclosure and 0 otherwise.  
The firm fixed effects subsume the main effect for disclosing firms, and the quarter fixed effects subsume the 
main effect for periods after the tax return disclosure.  The dependent variable is Log (Bid-ask spread) measured 
as the natural logarithm of the quarterly median of the daily bid-ask spread, lagged by four quarters, winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles daily.  Variables are defined in Appendix A. All regressions include firm fixed effects 
and quarter fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 5 Exploratory Test of Mandatory Disclosure Firms: How Firm Characteristics affect the 
relation between Mandatory Disclosure and Information Asymmetry? 






      
Post Mandatory Disclosure*Book-Tax Gap: Tax 
Expense -4.943***  
  (1.046)  
Post Mandatory Disclosure* Negative Book-Tax Gap: 
Revenue  -0.00710 
   (0.0502) 
   
Log(Market Value) -0.0944** -0.0364 
 (0.0454) (0.0587) 
Log(Share Turnover) 0.0170 0.0141 
 (0.0282) (0.0293) 
Log(Return Variability) 0.0843* 0.101** 
 (0.0462) (0.0479) 
Constant -3.129*** -3.469*** 
 (0.375) (0.423) 
   
Observations 1,176 1,176 
R-squared 0.133 0.102 
Number of firm 147 147 
quarter FE yes yes 
firm FE yes yes 
 
Notes: The sample includes all Australian mandatory disclosure firms. I estimate the following model: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + ɛ. 
Book-tax gap is the absolute number of the value on the tax return minus the value on the financial statements. 
The variable of interest is the interaction term. Columns (1) and (2) interact Post Mandatory Disclosure with the 
absolute book-tax gap of tax expense and revenue respectively.  
The firm fixed effects subsume the main effect for disclosing firms, and the quarter fixed effects subsume the 
main effect for periods after the tax return disclosure. The dependent variable is Log (Bid-ask spread) measured 
as the natural logarithm of the quarterly median of the daily bid-ask spread, lagged by four quarters, winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles daily.  Variables are defined in Appendix A. All regressions include firm fixed effects 
and quarter fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 6 Additional Tests: Mandatory Disclosure, Voluntary Disclosure, and Information 
Asymmetry among Investors 








        
Post Mandatory Disclosure   -0.126**   
 (0.0578)   
Post Mandatory Disclosure & Voluntary 
Commitment    -0.117  
  (0.0849)  
Post Mandatory Disclosure & No 
Voluntary Commitment    -0.127**  
  (0.0583)  
Post Mandatory Disclosure & Voluntary 
Disclosure     0.0296 
   (0.0719) 
Post Mandatory Disclosure & No 
Voluntary Disclosure     -0.139** 
   (0.0583) 
F-Test for differences across coefficients 
(P-value)  0.8794  0.0015 
    
Log(Market Value) -0.0112 -0.0115 -0.0138 
 (0.0469) (0.0470) (0.0469) 
Log(Share Turnover) -0.00632 -0.00630 -0.00614 
 (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222) 
Log(Return Variability) 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0393) (0.0387) 
Constant -3.733*** -3.732*** -3.728*** 
 (0.319) (0.319) (0.320) 
    
Observations 6,104 6,104 6,104 
R-squared 0.101 0.101 0.104 
Number of firm 763 763 763 
quarter FE yes yes yes 
firm FE yes yes yes 
 
Notes: This table presents results for the difference-in-differences analysis of the general trend in information 
asymmetry. Column (1) examines the effect of mandatory disclosure on information asymmetry, column (2) 
further compares mandatory disclosure firms with and without voluntary commitment, and column (3) splits the 
mandatory disclosure group into firms with and without voluntary disclosure. The sample includes all Australian 
firms; all regressions are based on an entropy-balanced sample. 
I estimate the following models for columns (1), (2), and (3) respectively: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)
𝑡𝑖
=  𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + ɛ          
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)
𝑡𝑖









𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + ɛ    
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑)
𝑡𝑖









𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗 + ɛ . 
The firm fixed effects subsume the main effect for disclosing firms, and the quarter fixed effects subsume the 
main effect for periods after the tax return disclosure. The dependent variable is Log (Bid-ask spread) measured 
as the natural logarithm of the quarterly median of the daily bid-ask spread, lagged by four quarters, winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles daily. The variable of interest in column (1), Post Mandatory Disclosure, is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i is on the list of ATO mandatory disclosures and quarter t occurs after the 
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release of the disclosure (quarters beginning in or after December 2015), and 0 otherwise. The variables of interest 
in column (2), Post Mandatory Disclosure & Voluntary Commitment and Post Mandatory Disclosure & No 
Voluntary Commitment, denote whether firm i is on the list of ATO mandatory disclosures, quarter t occurs after 
the release of the disclosure, and the firm is voluntarily committed (not committed) to disclose between the first 
and second mandatory disclosure, respectively. The variables of interest in column (3), Post Mandatory 
Disclosure & Voluntary Disclosure and Post Mandatory Disclosure & No Voluntary Disclosure, denote whether 
firm i is on the list of ATO mandatory disclosures, quarter t occurs after the release of the disclosure, and firm i 
has (does not have) voluntary disclosure between the first and second mandatory disclosure, respectively. I control 
for size, share turnover, and return variability in all specifications. Variables are defined in Appendix A. All 
regressions include firm fixed effects and quarter fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are presented in 
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